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One of the first important strategy decisions that defense counsel
across the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania often face at the outset
of a civil case is whether to join a third party as an additional
defendant. Because of applicable time limits, many counsel make
the decision quickly, with only minimal information, in an attempt
to shift to the joined party all or a portion of the liability for
plaintiff's claim. At the time the joinder decision must be made,
however, counsel may not realize the explosive, adverse
consequences that the joined party's presence may create at trial.
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Counsel may be unaware that once a defendant joins a third party,
the defendant will be foreclosed from discontinuing its claims, even
if it later becomes apparent through discovery that the joined
party's presence will prejudice the defendant.
Consider a recent case arising out of an automobile accident
involving two vehicles. Vehicle A contains three occupants - the
mother-driver and her two daughters, who are passengers. Vehicle
B is driven by an employee of a deep-pocket corporation. While
Vehicle B is passing Vehicle A, the mother loses control of her
vehicle and it plunges off the road. The two daughters are seriously
injured.
After investigating their case for close to two years, the two
daughters file suit against the driver of Vehicle B and his employer,
but do not name their mother, the driver of Vehicle A, as a
defendant. Defendants are served with the complaint two weeks
before the expiration of the two-year statute of limitations
applicable to personal injury actions.'
Faced with the sixty-day time limit under the Pennsylvania Rules
2
of Civil Procedure for joining additional defendants as of right,
defendants quickly join the mother-driver as an additional
defendant. Defendants join the mother within the sixty-day period
to preserve their right to argue that she is "solely liable on the
3
plaintiff's cause of action."
Subsequent discovery shows that the mother's driving indeed was
negligent and that she was principally, if not wholly, responsible
for the accident. The decision to join the mother as an additional
1. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5524 (1997).
2. PA. R. CIv. P. 2253 ("[N]either praecipe for a writ to join an additional defendant nor
a complaint if the joinder is commenced by complaint, shall be filed by the original
defendant or an additional defendant later than sixty (60) days after the service upon the
original defendant of the initial pleading of the plaintiff or any amendment thereof unless
such filing is allowed by the court upon cause shown.") (emphasis added).
3. See PA. R. Civ. P. 2252(a)(1) (a defendant may join as an additional defendant any
person, whether or not a party to the action, who may be "solely liable on the plaintiff's
cause of action"). In the example, if defendants do not join the mother-driver within the
sixty-day period, the joinder will occur outside the original statute of limitations on plaintiffs
claims. Joining an additional defendant outside the original statute of limitations restricts
defendants to bringing only an action for contribution or indemnity against the
mother-driver. Defendants will be prevented from arguing that the mother-driver is "solely
liable" to plaintiffs. See Oviatt v. Automated Entrance System Co., 583 X2d 1223 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1990); Dash v. Wilap Corp., 495 A.2d 950, 954 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985); Brown v. Mendisana,
11 Pa. D. & C. 3d 218, 220 (C.P. Northampton County, 1979); Harvan v. Colancecco, 65 Pa. D.
& C.2d 533, 535 (C.P. Carbon County 1974); 7 GOODRicH-AmRA~M 2D, STANDARD PENNSYLVANIA
PRAcncE, § 2252(a): 16 (1992) (discussing effect of statutes of limitation on the right to join
additional defendants).
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defendant, thus, appears to have been a wise one. Discovery,
however, also reveals a troubling fact: the mother has only limited
liability insurance and no other financial resources to satisfy a jury
verdict.
Because of this latter revelation, defendants now unwittingly
have placed themselves in a quandary. If the case proceeds to trial
and a substantial jury verdict is entered jointly against the
defendants and the insolvent additional defendant mother,
defendants will be responsible for satisfying not only the
percentage of fault attributed to them by the jury, but also that
amount of the verdict that the mother cannot satisfy because of her
limited resources. 4 When the harsh effects of the doctrine of joint
and several liability become clear,5 defendants attempt to
4. Under Pennsylvania's age-old doctrine of joint and several liability, each party is
liable to the plaintiff for the full amount of any judgment that she obtains. See 42 PA CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 7102(b) (1997). Therefore, if the additional defendant mother cannot pay her
judicially-determined share of a judgment awarded to plaintiffs at trial, the original
defendants (as the deep-pockets) must make up the difference.
5. Several courts have noted that application of the doctrine of joint and several
liability produces unfair results in some circumstances. See Elder v. Orluck, 515 A-2d 517,
524 (Pa. 1986) (noting the unfairness that may result under the doctrine of joint and several
liability when a tortfeasor cannot be made to pay his proportionate share of damages); Smith
v. Weissenfels, 657 A.2d 949 (Pa- Super. Ct. 1995) (contribution allowed among joint
tortfeasors because it is unfair to impose the financial burden of the plaintiff's loss on one
tortfeasor to the exclusion of the others).
In Charles v. Giant Eagle Markets, 522 A-2d 1 (Pa. 1987), Justice Papadokos intimated that
Pennsylvania's adoption of comparative negligence modified the common law of joint and
several liability:
In my view our comparative negligence statute represents a departure from the prior
law on the subject which made all tortfeasors jointly and severally liable for an equal
pro tanto proportion of the judgment. If meaning is to be given to the legislature's
definition of a defendant's liability, I have no choice but to conclude that joint and
several liability, as formerly known to the common law, has been modified to some
extent by our comparative negligence statute.
Charles, 522 A.2d at 10 (Papadokos, J., concurring) (citations omitted, emphasis added).
Despite these statements, Pennsylvania courts have not abandoned joint and several liability.
Only eleven jurisdictions apply the doctrine of joint and several liability: Alabama, Delaware,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Virginia, and West Virginia. The other American jurisdictions have either modified or completely abolished joint and
several liability. See VICTOR E. ScHiwARrz, COMPARATivE NEGUGENCE § 15.4 (3d ed., 1994 & Supp.
1997); Kathleen M. O'Connor & Gregory R Sreenan, Apportionment of Damages: Evolution
of a Fauit-Based System of Liability For Negligence, 61 J. Am L. & CoM. 365 (1996);
Jonathan Cardi, Note, Apportioning Responsibility to Immune Nonparties: An Argument
Based on Comparative Responsibility and the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts, 82
IOWA L. REv. 1293 (1997). See also ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.080 (1997); ARrz. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 12-2506 (A) (1997); Cow. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-111.5 (1990); Watters v. Pelican Int'l Inc., 706 F
Supp. 1452 (D. Colo. 1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258(a) (1987); Stueve v. American Honda
Motors, 457 F Supp. 740 (D. Kansas 1978); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-11-101 to -106 (1997);
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discontinue their third-party claims against the mother. Although
plaintiffs thoroughly investigated their case prior to filing and chose
not to name their mother as a defendant, they now object to the
dismissal.
How should a court rule on this motion to discontinue? The
equities seem to favor allowing defendants to discontinue their
claims against the mother-driver. 6 A contrary ruling would seem to
reward plaintiffs for sleeping on their rights by failing to join a
known potential tortfeasor, and penalize defendants for their
diligence in promptly joining all other parties who were potentially
liable for the accident. Nevertheless, Pennsylvania courts, when
faced with an objection by a plaintiff, most likely would deny leave
to defendants to discontinue their third-party claims.'
McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52, 57-58, 60 (Tenn. 1992) (discussing "obsolete" doctrine of
joint and several liability); WASH REV. CODE § 4.22.070 (1997).
Several commentators also have harshly criticized the doctrine. See, e.g., Aaron D. Twerski,
The Joint Tortfeasor Legislative Revolt: A Rational Response to the Critics, 22 U.C. DAVIs L
REV. 1125, 1132 (1989) (the doctrine "exponentially multiplies" the inherent unfairness of tort
liability); Gregory C. Sisk, Interpretationof the Statutory Modification of Joint and Several
Liability: Resisting the Deconstructionof Tort Reform, 16 U. PUGET SOUND L REV. 1, 6 (1992)
(discussing the Washington Tort Reform Act).
6. PA. R. Civ. P. 229, which governs the discontinuance of claims against an additional
defendant before the commencement of trial, provides that written consent of all parties or
leave of court is required before claims can be discontinued "as to less than all defendants."
Id. at subsection (b). A court, upon petition and after notice, may strike off a discontinuance
in order to protect the rights of any party from "unreasonable inconvenience, vexation,
harassment, expense, or prejudice." Id. at subsection (c). Some courts have required a party
seeking to strike off a discontinuance to show that he has been deprived of a substantial
right (Martinelli v. Mulloy, 299 A.2d 19, 20 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1972)), or that he has suffered
actual prejudice. Id.
In determining whether to strike off a discontinuance, a court will consider the prejudice
to both sides and balance the competing interests of the parties. Courts also will inquire into
the fairness of the discontinuance and the impact of the discontinuance on the defendant's
ability to defend. Mizes v. Mizes, 10 Pa. D. & C. 4th 669, 671 (C.R Montour County 1989).
A discontinuance will be stricken off where its purpose is to harass the defendant through
the commencement of another suit in a different court on the same cause of action. Kline v.
State Public School Bldg. Auth., 152 A.2d 455 (Pa. 1959); Brown v. T.W. Phillips Gas & Oil
Co., 74 A.2d 105 (Pa. 1950); Brower v. Berio Vending Co., 386 A.2d 11 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978).
7. Goodrich-Amram summarizes the current state of Pennsylvania law:
In view of the rights accorded the plaintiff against the additional defendant once he
has been joined, and because the action is treated as one in which the plaintiff had
sued both the original and additional defendants initially, the joining party cannot
obtain a discontinuance over the objection of the plaintiff.
7 GOODRIcH-AmRAm 2D, STANDARD PENNSYLVANIA PRACTICE, § 2255(d):1 (1992) (emphasis added)
(citing Staccone v. Scranton-Spring Brook Water Service Co., 5 Pa. D. & C. 2d 191 (C.P.
Iycoming County 1955)).
The Court of Common Pleas of Forest County, Pennsylvania recently ruled upon the
scenario presented in the example and denied defendants' motion to discontinue their
third-party claim. The case arose out of an automobile accident case involving catastrophic
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This article addresses the pitfalls in third-party practice that may
trap the unseasoned practitioner and bedevil the experienced one
as well. A defendant's decision to join a third party, though
well-intentioned, may have the effect of requiring the defendant to
pay more than its judicially allocated share of damages. 8 The article
contends that the current joinder rules, in some circumstances,
unfairly penalize a defendant who diligently brings before the court
in one action all additional parties who may be liable for the events
at issue. For these reasons, the article proposes an amendment to
the joinder rules and to the standards applicable to a defendant's
dismissal of its claims against a joined party before trial.
I.

PENNSYLVANIA'S

JOINDER RULES

Pennsylvania imposes a very short time limit on defendants for
joining third parties as a matter of rightY Pa. R. Civ. P. 2253
provides a defendant with only sixty days after service of the initial
pleading to join an additional defendant. 10 After this period, 1
injuries to passengers. Defendants sought to discontinue their third-party claims against the
driver (plaintiffs' mother) of the car in which the passengers were riding because of the
potentially harmful effects of joint and several liability. Despite the fact that both plaintiffs
and their counsel were well aware of plaintiffs' mother and had chosen initially not to sue
her, plaintiffs opposed the discontinuance. The court, without opinion, denied defendants'
motion to discontinue. Lundy, et. al., v. Holtz, et al., No. 35 of 1993 (C.P. Forest County)
(orders dated Oct. 1, 1996 and Dec. 20, 1996).
8. Joinder, to some, may appear to be a mundane topic. The legendary Philip W.
Amram, in addressing Pennsylvania's joinder rules nearly sixty years ago, thanked his
audience at the Pennsylvania Bar Association for "the attention you have given me because
[third-party] practice is, unfortunately, a dull subject, although it is interesting to us, who are
working on it actively." Philip W. Amram, The New Procedural Rules, Report of the
Forty-Fifth Annual Meeting of the Pennsylvania Bar Ass'n 86 (June 21, 1939).
As will be demonstrated, the decisions to join an additional defendant, and the timing of
the joinder, are anything but ministerial tasks. The decisions are important and often
substantially impact the amount of settlement, or the amount of damages following trial, that
an original defendant ultimately pays.
9. Pennsylvania's joinder rules, on their face, are simply worded. Pa. R. Civ. P. 2252(a)
allows a defendant to join as an additional defendant a third party who may be (1) solely
liable on the plaintiff's cause of action, or (2) liable over to the joining party on the plaintiff's
cause of action, or (3) jointly or severally liable with the joining party on the plaintiff's cause
of action, or (4) liable to the joining party on any cause of action arising out of the
transaction or occurrence upon which the plaintiffs cause of action is based. Id.
10. PA R Civ. P. 2253; see supra note 2. Pa R. Civ. P. 2253 was originally adopted on
February 14, 1939 and was effective September 4, 1939. The Rule was amended in 1942,
1958, and most recently on April 4, 1990. PA- R. Civ. P. 2253 (note).
11. The 60-day period is especially short when compared to the time that it normally
takes to move a case through discovery and to trial. In most counties in Pennsylvania, this
period will span at least several years due to lengthy discovery, court backlogs and the
increased number of case filings. These issues are sometimes brought to the public's
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defendants can only join an additional defendant with leave of
court "upon cause shown." 2 Courts have held that "cause shown"
requires the defendant to demonstrate, by affidavit or otherwise, its
diligence in determining the identity of the additional defendant
and promptness in seeking leave to join the entity as a party.13 If a
defendant does not proffer a reasonable justification for the
14
untimely joinder, the trial court can and will deny leave to join.
Once a third party is joined, Pa. R. Civ. P 2255 governs
third-party practice. Pa. R. Civ. P 2255 provides that an action
between a defendant and a joined party is "the same as though the
attention in unflattering and often slanted newspaper articles. See, e.g., Margaret Gibbons,
Arbitration 'Fast Track' Hoped to Cut Into Backlog, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 21, 1996,
at S5 (detailing civil case backlog in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County);
see also, Bill Heltzel, The Court's Most Diligent Judge, PrrrSBURGH POST-GAZEITE, Feb. 17,
1998, at A-1, A-8 (discussing civil case backlog in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny
County).
12. Pa. R. Civ. P 2253 does not specify what constitutes "cause shown," nor does it
delineate the criteria that a court should consider in deciding a petition for joinder. Lamoree
v. Penn Central Transp. Co., 357 A.2d 595, 597 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976). These issues are instead
left to the sound discretion of the trial courts across the Commonwealth.
13. The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating sufficient cause to allow the late
joinder. NPW Med. Ctr. of N.E. Pa., Inc. v. L.S. Design Group, P.C., 509 A-2d 1306 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1986); Kovalesky v. Esther Williams Swimming Pools, 497 A.2d 661 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
Leave is by no means freely granted. Whether an extension of time will be granted is largely
a matter of trial court discretion. A defendant must demonstrate: (1) some reasonable
justification or excuse for the delay; (2) a statement of the facts alleged to render the
proposed additional defendant liable, liable with or liable over to the defendant; and
(3) allegations that the late joinder will not be prejudicial to the proposed additional
defendant. DiLauro v. One Bala Avenue Assoc., 515 A-2d 939, 942 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986); see 7
GOODRIcH-AMRAM 2D, STANDARD PENNSYLVANIA PRACTICE, §§ 2253:6-9 (1992).

Trial courts have refused to allow joinder in cases where defendants failed to provide
reasonable justification for the delay. Consul v. Burke, 589 A-2d 246 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991);
Desiderio v. R&R Tire Center, Inc., 363 A.2d 1197 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976); Lamoree v. Penn
Central Transp. Co., 357 A.2d 595 (Pa- Super. Ct. 1976); Moore v. Howard P. Foley Co., 340
A.2d 519, 523 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1975).
Pennsylvania courts have declined to adopt fixed time limits in determining whether a
particular delay in joining a third party is too lengthy. For example, a delay of
thirteen-and-a-half months after the expiration of the 60-day period "[was] a long time, but
this, in and of itself, [would] not [be] determinative." Zakian v. Liljestrand, 264 A-2d 638,
641-642 (Pa. 1970); see also Lamoree, 357 A.2d at 595 (trial court abused its discretion in
refusing joinder eight and one-half months after expiration of the 60-day period in PA. R. Civ.
P. 2253). But see Welch Foods, Inc. v. Bishopric Products Co., 385 A.2d 1007, 1009 (PaSuper. Ct. 1978) joinder following substantial discovery over three years in three different
cities, including the depositions of fifteen witnesses, would unduly delay pending action).
14. If the trial court denies leave to join, a defendant still possesses an action for
contribution and/or indemnity against the additional party, which can be initiated up to six
years after the conclusion of the principal suit. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5527 (1982);
Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nicholson Constr. Co., 542 A.2d 123, 126 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1988). Because of the time and expense that it normally takes to litigate, the principal suit to
conclusion, however, this option is inefficient and is often impracticable.
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party joining the additional defendant were a plaintiff and the
additional defendant were a defendant."15 Subsection (d) of Pa. R.
Civ. P 2255 further provides:
The plaintiff shall recover from an additional defendant found
liable to him alone or jointly with the defendant as though
such additional defendant had been joined as a defendant and
duly served and the initial pleading of the plaintiff had averred
16
such liability.
Subsection (d) of Pa. R. Civ. P 2255 is the Rule that Pennsylvania
courts have applied inequitably to defendants. Pa. R. Civ. P. 2255(d)
expressly provides that before a plaintiff can recover against a
joined party, the party must be found liable to her. In other words,
for the plaintiff to gain the benefit of recovery, the additional
defendant must remain a party at the time the case proceeds to a
finding of liability. 17 Pa. R. Civ. P 2255(d) is silent on whether a
defendant should be permitted to dismiss its third-party claims
against the joined party before a finding of liability.
Even though Pa. R. Civ. P 2255 does not preclude a defendant
from discontinuing its third-party claims, it is generally
acknowledged that the Rule permits a plaintiff to block a8
defendant's attempt to dismiss its third-party claims before trial.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and other lower courts have
interpreted Pa. R. Civ. P 2255 to vest plaintiffs with direct claims
against an additional defendant from the time of joinder forward,
15. PA.R Civ. P. 2255(a).
16. Id. subsection (d) (emphasis added).
17. 'Under operation of Pa. R. Civ. P. 2253, f1a third party is timely joined at the outset
of the case (i.e., within sixty days after the service upon the original defendant of the initial
pleading of the plaintiff) and the party is found liable to plaintiff, plaintiff can directly
recover against the additional defendant, solely or jointly and severally, with the defendant.
Plaintiff can recover just as though the joined party was named as an original defendant at
the beginning of the case. The joined party is subject to the plaintiffs claims with the same
force and effect just as if she was named as an original defendant. Sheriff v. Eisele, 112 A.2d
165, 166 (Pa. 1955); Burke v. Duquesne Light, 332 A.2d 544, 547 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1974);
Pushnik v. Winky's Drive-in Restaurants, Inc., 363 A.2d 1291, 1297-98 (Pa Super. Ct. 1976);
Richards v. Alston, 553 A.2d 488, 490-91, appeal denied, 574 A.2d 75 (Pa. 1989). In other
words, plaintiff's complaint is deemed to incorporate all allegations of third-party liability
contained in the defendant's third-party complaint. Incollingo v. Ewing, 282 A.2d 206, 221 (Pa.
1971).
18. See, e.g., Staccone v. Scranton-Spring Brook Water Serv. Co., 5 Pa. D. & C. 2d 191,
192 (C.P. [Lycoming County 1955); 7 GOODRICH-AMRAM 2D, STANDARD PENNSYLVANIA PRACTIcE,
§ 2255(d):1 (1992). The dearth of case law on this important issue is rather surprising, given
the wording of Pa. R. Civ. P. 2255(d), which allows a plaintiff to "recover from an additional
defendant found liable to him . .." (emphasis added).
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not merely following a finding of liability. 19 Thus, even though a
defendant determines, at its option, whether to join an additional
party, a plaintiff immediately upon joinder becomes the "master" of
all third-party claims.
The practical effect of this interpretation often has dramatic
consequences. A defendant faced with the sixty-day time limit for
joinder who, in the exercise of diligence, joins an additional party
at the outset of litigation likely becomes forever stuck with the
joined party. The defendant likely will be prevented from later
discontinuing its claims against the joined party, regardless of
whether the joined party's presence will prejudice the defendant at
trial.20 When the additional defendant turns out to be
judgment-proof, plaintiffs can capitalize on a quickly-forced joinder
decision that only later, in light of discovery, proves to be
improvident. 21 This result is inequitable, especially in circumstances
where the plaintiff knew or should have known the identity of the
additional defendant before filing suit yet chose not to sue the
joined party. In these circumstances, plaintiffs should have no right
to block the discontinuance.
II.

CASE LAW INTERPRETATION OF THE JOINDER RULES

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania's decision in Sheriff v.
Eisele22 was the first case to vest a plaintiff with rights against the
joined party immediately at the time of joinder, rather than after a
verdict holding the joined party either solely or jointly liable to
19. Sheniff, 112 A.2d at 166; see supra note 7.
20. Staccone, 5 Pa. D. & C. 2d at 192. As an added windfall, the plaintiff need not take
any action to claim advantage of this rule. An additional defendant becomes subject to the
plaintiff's claim without the plaintiff ever needing to amend his complaint to include him. See
Sheriff, 112 A.2d at 166; Pushnik, 363 A.2d at 1297-98.
21. A diligent defendant, with especially keen foresight, may quickly attempt to
discover the financial resources of an additional defendant before initiating joinder. The
realties of litigation, however, make it extremely difficult to pursue such discovery
successfully within the sixty-day period. See infra note 76. Such discovery, in any event, is
by no means routinely attempted by defense counsel before joinder is completed.
A court may not be at all sympathetic to a defendant's contention that joinder was delayed
beyond the sixty-day period due to incomplete discovery on the issue of whether the
additional defendant was judgment proof. Cf. Ferrari v. Antonacci, 689 A2d 320 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1977) (affirming trial court's dismissal of action on grounds that it had not been timely
transferred to state court following its dismissal by federal court for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction; superior court refused to acknowledge plaintiff's "excuse" that the delay was
caused by uncertainty over whether the defendant was "judgment proof"), appeal denied,
698 A.2d 594 (Pa. 1997).
22. 112 A2d 165 (Pa. 1955).
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plaintiff. The distinction is crucial: if the plaintiff's rights do not
vest until a finding of liability, plaintiff should have no power to
block a defendant's decision to dismiss its third-party claims before
that finding.
In Sheriff, the supreme court held that plaintiff's default
judgment against the additional defendant did not preclude
plaintiff's claims against the original defendant 23 After quoting the
language of Pa. R. Civ. R 2255(d), the court, in dicta, went on to
state that "an additional defendant, when joined as such, becomes
immediately subject to plaintiffs claim in every respect and with
the same force and effect as if he had been originally named as a
defendant, and even without the necessity of any pleading being
24
filed by the plaintiff against him."
Since Sheriff, plaintiffs have seized on the "immediately subject
to plaintiffs claim" language to contend that they control
third-party claims against an additional defendant from the time of
joinder, and that defendants, as a consequence, have no right to
dismiss an additional defendant before a finding of liability. Most
decisions have accepted this argument. In Moscatiello v. Pittsburgh
Contractors Equip. Co.,25 the superior court applied Sheriff v.
Eisele to hold that "an additional defendant [who] is joined
pursuant to Rule 2255(d) . . . becomes subject to the plaintiffs
claim in every respect and with the same force and effect 'as if he

had been originally named as a defendant . .

"26

In Pappas v.

Asbel, 27 the court held that "[tihe effect of a third party complaint
23. The court initially complained that the appeal followed a 'pattern, all too frequent,
in which an inordinate amount of time is consumed in fruitless litigation involving merely
procedural controversies." Sheriff, 112 A.2d at 166. The court then went on to adopt an
interpretation of the joinder rules that is inconsistent with the legislative history and intent
of the rules. See infra Section III.
24. Sheriff, 112 A.2d at 166 (emphasis added). Interestingly, the supreme court in
Sheriff did not cite to a single prior decision or otherwise provide authority or a rationale
for its departure from the interpretation of the rule followed by all of the cases prior to its
ruling. See infra Sections III and IV.Nor has the supreme court since Sheriff shown any
inclination to return to its prior interpretation of the rule. See infra notes 57-73 and
accompanying text.
25. 595 A.2d 1198 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991), appeal denied, 602 A.2d 860 (Pa. 1992). In
Moscatiello, the superior court held that the trial court did not err in finding the additional
defendant directly liable to the plaintiff where the additional defendant was properly joined,
and where the facts at trial supported a conclusion that the additional party was solely liable
to plaintiff. The court noted that "[tihe sole issue is whether the facts at trial established that
[the additional defendant] was liable to [plaintiff] Moscatiello solely, jointly, or severally." Id.
at 1203.
26. Id. at 1203.
27. 675 A.2d 711 (Pa Super. Ct. 1996).
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joining an additional defendant is thus to make the additional
defendant 'immediately subject to the plaintiffs claim. . . '"28 Other
courts have held similarly. 29 The road is very short from the
proposition that an additional defendant is "immediately subject to"
plaintiff's claims to the holding that a plaintiff can block a
defendant's attempt to dismiss its claims against an additional
defendant before a finding of liability.30
Contrary to the dicta in Sheriff, the plain language of Pa. R. Civ.
P 2255 provides only that a plaintiff "shall recover from an
additional defendant found liable to him .. ."3 The Rule states that
plaintiff's rights against the additional defendant do not attach until
after the evidence establishes that the joined party is liable to
plaintiff, either alone or jointly with the defendant. Nevertheless,
the Sheriff court effectively amended the language of Pa. R. Civ. P.
2255 by stating that the filing of a third-party complaint
"immediately" vests a plaintiff with rights against the joined party.

Notwithstanding the dicta in Sheriff, a small number of courts
have suggested that the joinder rules do not vest a plaintiff with
rights

against

a joined party

until a finding

of liability.32 In

28. Id. at 718. In Pappas, the superior court held that the fact that an original
defendant joined a third-party defendant, with no further action by plaintiff, did not preclude
plaintiff from recovering from the additional defendant upon a finding at trial that the
additional defendant was liable to plaintiff. The court noted that even though plaintiff did not
expressly assert claims against the additional party, he still could recover directly against
him if the facts adduced at trial demonstrated sole or joint liability to plaintiff.
29. See cases cited in supra note 17.
30. See, e.g., Staccone v. Scranton-Spring Brook Water Service Co., 5 Pa. D. & C. 2d
191, 192 (C.P. Lycoming County 1955). The court in the Lundy v. Holtz case, see supra note
7, relied on the Sheriff language to block defendants' attempt to dismiss the additional
defendant before trial. Plaintiffs argued that defendants, by joining the additional defendant,
vested plaintiffs with a direct cause of action against the additional party and forfeited their
right to dismiss the third-party claims. The court considered defendants' arguments regarding
the inequity of requiring the additional defendant to remain in the case, but ultimately sided
with plaintiffs and denied leave to discontinue.
31. PA R. Civ. P. 2255(d) (emphasis added).
32. These decisions seemingly have attempted to back away from the bright line
created in Sheriff and have held that the joinder rules do not create rights in a plaintiff until
trial. Martinelli v. Mulloy, 299 A.2d 19 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1972), see infra note 33, is the most
thoroughly reasoned decision.
In Richards v. Alston, 553 A.2d 488, 490-91 (Pa. Commw. 1989), appeal denied, 574 A.2d 75
(Pa. 1989), the commonwealth court noted that under Pa. R. Civ. P. 2255(d), a plaintiff, "even
though he or she may have asserted no claim against an additional defendant in a pleading
against it, may recover directly from an additional defendant as from an original defendant
when the facts established at trial show that the additional defendant is liable to him or her
either solely or jointly or severally with the original defendant" (emphasis added). In other
words, Pa. R. Civ. P. 2255(d) does not vest a plaintiff with rights until evidence establishes at
trial that the additional defendant is liable. Before that point, a plaintiff should be able to
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Martinelli v. Mulloy,33 the court noted that the joinder rules "were
not intended to enable a plaintiff who has no control over
litigation between the defendant and the additional defendant, to

effectively prevent an adjudication of their rights."34 The Martinelli
court reasoned that purpose of Pa. R. Civ. P. 2255 is "to save the
original defendant from possible harm resulting from loss of
evidence as might result if compelled to await the end of the suit
before proceeding against those from whom he seeks
contribution."3 5 The court noted that "[t]he overriding concern must
be to allow the defendant to protect her position by the exercise of
her right to face the jury together with the party she sought to
join." 6
Similarly, in Dash v. Wilap Corp.,3 7 the trial court granted

defendant's petition to discontinue its third-party claims and denied
plaintiff's motion to file an amended complaint naming the
additional defendant as a defendant. The superior court, without
considering

the

Sheriff decision,

affirmed

the

trial

court's

assert no control over the third-party complaint See also Dash v. Wilap Corp., 495 A.2d 950
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (affirming trial court's allowing a defendant to discontinue his
third-party complaint before trial, but permitting plaintiff to amend his complaint to add
claims against the additional defendant).
33. 299 A.2d 19 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1972). In Martinelli,plaintiff-passenger in an automobile
accident sued the driver of the automobile in which she was riding and the driver of another
automobile for her injuries. Immediately before trial, plaintiff discontinued her claims against
one defendant, and the remaining defendant attempted to file a third-party complaint against
the dismissed defendant. The trial court denied the defendant's motion for leave. The
superior court reversed, holding that the remaining defendant should have been allowed
additional time in which to join the other driver as an additional defendant.
Analyzing Pa. R. Civ. P 2252, the Martinelli court noted that the Rule should be given a
broad interpretation, not only to compel every interested person to defend the action by the
plaintiff "but also to save the original defendant from possible harm resulting from loss of
evidence as might result if compelled to await the end of the suit before proceeding against
those from whom he seeks contribution." Id. at 21.
34. Id. at 21-22 (emphasis added). In reaching its holding, the court relied on several
decisions handed down before Sheriff v. Eisele. See Wnek v. Boyle, 96 A.2d 857, 859 (Pa.
1953); Rau v. Manko, 17 A.2d 422, 424 (Pa. 1941); Vinnacombe v. City of Philadelphia, 147
A. 826, 828 (Pa. 1929). The Martinelli court relied on these decisions for the proposition that
the joinder rules are to be construed to avoid multiplicity of suits by adjudicating in one suit
the rights and liabilities of all the parties to a single transaction which constitutes the cause
of action. MartineUi, 299 A.2d at 21.
35. Id. at 21.
36. Id. at 22.
37. 495 A-2d 950 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985). In Dash, plaintiff filed suit against a
defendant-landowner for injuries sustained from an assault. The assault was committed by
an individual who used the wild conditions on the landowner's property as cover in order to
gain access to plaintiff's property. The defendant filed a third-party complaint against the
assailant, but later sought to dismiss the claims when it became evident that the individual
was judgment-proof.
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allowance of defendant's discontinuance of the third-party
complaint and rejected plaintiffs' argument that the joinder rules
vested them with the exclusive authority to discontinue claims
against a party-litigant. 8 The court observed that "because the
original defendant (joining party) and additional defendant Rightly
(joined party) were to be considered as plaintiff and defendant,
respectively (see Pa. R. Civ. P 2255(a)), the trial court acted
properly under the imprimatur of Pa. R. Civ. P. 229 in acting upon
[defendant's] motion to discontinue as to [additional defendant]
Rightly."39
III.

LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA'S JOINDER RULES

The legislative history and the historical developments leading up
to Pennsylvania's present joinder rules do not support the Sheriff v.
Eisele interpretation that a joined party becomes "immediately
subject to" plaintiff's claims. Rather, the legislative history
demonstrates that the primary intent of the joinder rules was to aid
defendants by providing them with a procedural device to
adjudicate, at their election, all rights and liabilities of all those
potentially liable in a single suit. The rules were designed to allow
defendants the option to avoid multiplicity of suits and secure a
speedy and inexpensive determination of all rights in one suit.4°
"What is frequently referred to as 'Third Party Procedure' had its
origin in Pennsylvania..." 41 Pennsylvania's rules governing joinder
of additional defendants were originally enacted in 1929 to allow a
defendant a means to place before the court all persons who are or
may be liable to a plaintiff on her cause of action.42 These rules
38. Id. at 956.
39. Id. at 956 n.3. The court, however, went on to hold that the plaintiffs were entitled
to amend their complaint in order to add the dismissed party as a defendant, even though
the statute of limitations had long since run. Id. at 956. The court provided no rationale or
authority for this holding, which effectively amended the statute of limitations applicable to
plaintiff's claims by allowing her to make claims against the additional defendant a full two
years after the statute had run.
40. Martinelli, 299 A.2d at 21; see also Wnek, 96 A.2d at 859; Rau, 17 A.2d at 424-25;
Vinnacombe, 147 A. at 827-28.
41. Pennsylvania Bar Ass'n, Report of the Forty-Eighth Annual Meeting, June 30 - July
2, 1942, at 141. In 1927, the Pennsylvania Bar Association Committee on Civil Law
recommended a "brief and simple" statute to initiate the "novelty" of third-party practice in
the United States. Id. The suggested statute was brought up for approval in 1928 and became
law in 1929. Id.
42. See Pub. L. No. 197, April 10, 1929. Prior to the enactment of the 1929 joinder
statute, the common law governed joinder of additional parties. Common law joinder
depended entirely upon the nature of the plaintiff's cause of action. If the plaintiff's cause of

Traps for the Unwary

1998

were designed to alleviate the prejudice suffered by named
defendants in having to pursue several actions to obtain
contribution or indemnity from a missing party.43 The new rules
permitted an original defendant to join a third party from whom
the original defendant claimed contribution as a result of the suit
commenced by the plaintiff.44 Under this procedure, the plaintiff
had no interest in the litigation between the original defendant and
45
the additional defendant.
The procedure set forth in the original joinder rules proved to be
problematic where, at trial, the original defendant's evidence
demonstrated that the additional defendant was solely liable to the
plaintiff.46 In this circumstance, no judgment could be entered in
plaintiffs favor against the joined party because it was understood
that "[niothing in the act shows the slightest intention to affect
plaintiffs . . ."47 Plaintiffs were left with no recourse against an
action was joint, i.e., involved the alleged action or inaction of more than one defendant,
and one of the joint defendants was not named as a party, the named defendant's only
recourse was to seek an abatement of the action for nonjoinder of the essential party. See 7
GOODRIcH-AMRAM 2D, STANDARD PENNSYLVANIA PRACTICE, § 2252:1 (1992). If the missing
defendant was liable over to the named defendant on any ground other than pure joint
liability, the named defendant had no recourse but to wait until judgment was entered
against him and pursue a second suit against the missing defendant. Id. If the named
defendant wished to assert the sole liability of a missing defendant at trial, his only option
was to present evidence of the missing defendant's sole liability and argue it to the jury. Id.
43. See Pub. L. No. 197. In the preamble to Pub. L No. 197, the Pennsylvania
legislature explained the purpose of the statute: "To regulate procedure where a defendant
desires to have joined as additional defendants persons whom he alleges are liable over to
him, or jointly or severally liable with him, for the cause of action declared on."
44. See 12 PA STAT. § 141, suspended by Pa. R. Civ. R 2275(1) and repealed by Pub. L.
No. 202 § 2(a) [11001, April 28, 1978; Vinnacombe, 147 A. at 828; 7 GOODRICH-AMRAM 2D,
STANDARD PENNSYLVANIA PRACTICE, § 2252:1 (1992).

45.

Vinnacombe, 147 A. at 828; see discussion at infra notes 57-73 and accompanying

46.

7 GOODmcIH-ARAm

text.
2D, STANDARD PENNSYLVANIA PRACTICE, § 2252:1 (1992).

47. Id.; Vinnacombe, 147 A. at 828. The court described the complex procedure with
respect to judgments:
If, at trial, the jury's verdict is in favor of the original defendant, they need go no
further, but, if they find in favor of plaintiff, they should also specify in their verdict
• . . whether . . . [the additional defendant] or any of them, are liable over to the

original defendant, or jointly or severally liable with him, for the amount awarded to
plaintiff, and the extent of such liability... Whenever the final judgment is in favor of
the original defendant, the judgment against the additional defendants, if one has been
entered, should be stricken off on motion; but if it is adverse to both the original and
the additional defendants, plaintiff, upon receiving satisfaction from the original
defendant, should mark the suit to the use of the latter, and the additional defendants
will be liable to them, and execution may issue against them... for the proportion of
the recovery adjudged to be payable by them, without any further proceedings being
required to establish such liability.
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additional defendant other than to pursue a second suit against that
party, provided that the statute of limitations had not yet run.
To remedy this situation, the Pennsylvania legislature, in 1931,
passed Pub. L. No. 236, which amended the original joinder
statute. 48 Pub. L. No. 236 adopted what is now known as the "dual
object procedure."49 Under the procedure set forth in Pub. L. No.
236, a plaintiff was permitted to recover directly against an
additional defendant if the liability of the additional defendant was
proven at tria. 5° Pub. L. No. 236 provided:
Where it shall appear that an added defendant is liable to the
plaintiff, either alone or jointly with any other defendant, the
plaintiff may have verdict and judgment or other relief
against such additional defendant to the same extent as if
such defendant had been duly summoned by the plaintiff and
the statement of claim had been amended to include such
defendant ....51
The stated intent of the legislature in enacting the amendment to
the joinder rules was to allow plaintiffs to recover a judgment
against additional defendants if the evidence at trial so warranted:
To regulate procedure where a defendant desires to have
joined, as additional defendants, persons whom he alleges are
alone liable or liable over to him, or jointly or severally liable
with him, for the cause of action declared on, and providing
for entry of judgments against such additionaldefendants.52
Nowhere does the law provide, nor did the legislature intend to
grant, plaintiffs sole control over the cause of action against a
joined party.53 To the contrary, plaintiffs' rights under Pub. L.
No. 236 do not arise until the liability of an added defendant is
determined. 54 Even then, plaintiffs obtain only the right against the
Vinnacombe, 147 A. at 829.
48. Pub. L. No. 236, June 22, 1931, 12 PA- STAT. §141, suspended by Pa. R. Civ. P.
2275(2) and repealed by Pub. L. No. 202 §2(a)[1100], April 28, 1978.
49.

7 GOODRICH-AMRAM 2D, STANDARD PENNSYLVANIA PRACTICE, § 2252:1 (1992). Under the

dual object procedure, a plaintiff is permitted to have direct recovery against an additional
defendant whenever the liability of the additional defendant is proven. Id. The judgment
entered in the proceeding "finally determine[s] the rights of all three parties [without the
necessity of plaintiff filing a separate action against the liable additional defendant] . . ." Id.
50. Pub. L. No. 236.
51. Id. (italics in original).
52. See supra note 50 (italics in original).
53. See supra notes 47 and 48 and accompanying text.
54. Id.
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joined party to recover a verdict or judgment.5 5 Moreover, the
initial case law discussing the original joinder statute and the 1931
joinder amendment, Pub. L. No. 236, interprets the statutes
consistent with their plain language.5
IV.

CASE AUTHORITY INTERPRETING THE INITIAL JOINDER STATUTES

The pre-Sheriff cases that applied the original joinder rules and
the Pub. L. No. 236 amendment consistently held that the joinder
rules conferred benefits on defendants and granted only a right of
recovery to plaintiffs rather than control over the action between
defendants and additional defendants. In Vinnacombe v. City of
57 the seminal case interpreting the original
Philadelphia,
joinder
rules, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated this holding in
unmistakable terms:
Nothing in the act shows the slightest intention to affect
plaintiffs in such suits. Consequently, the adding of additional
defendants will give no higher right to plaintiffs than they
had before. As to them the action proceeds against the original
defendant only, exactly as it would have done if the additional
defendants had not been named...58
Similarly, in McCaulif v. Griffith, 9 the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania came to the same conclusion:
Nothing in the Act [of 1929] shows the slightest intention to
affect plaintiffs in such suits... The Act of 1929 was intended
to expedite procedure by avoiding a multiplicity of suits, and
it confers undoubted benefits upon defendants who pursue
the remedy indicated therein; but it does not alter the rights
which existed previous to its passage...
The amendment of June 22, 1931, supra, gives the right, at the
instance of defendant, to have joined, as additional
defendants, persons whom he alleges are alone liable, or
55.

Id.

56. McCaulif v. Griffith, 168 A. 536 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1933); Huber Invest. Co. v.
Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 176 A. 751 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1935); Sullivan v. City of Pittsburgh, 27
A.2d 270 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1942).
57. 147 A. 826 (Pa. 1929). The Vinnacombe decision was the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania's first exercise of the rule-making power conceded to it by the General
Assembly. See Pennsylvania Bar Ass'n, Report of the Forty-Eighth Annual Meeting, June 30 July 2, 1942 at 142.
58. Vinnacombe, 147 A. at 828 (emphasis added).
59. 168 A. 536 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1933).
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jointly or severally liable with him . . . and provides for the
entry of judgments against such additional defendants. It,
however, as indicated by its title, was 'to regulate procedure'
60

The superior court, in Huber Invest. Co. v. Philadelphia Nat'l
Bank,6 1 again interpreted the provisions of the original joinder
statute and the Pub. L. No. 236 amendment as only enlarging a trial
court's power to enter judgments in favor of plaintiffs against
additional defendants and not providing plaintiffs with control over
the action between the defendant and additional defendant. In
analyzing whether, under the joinder statutes, a joined party could
be solely liable to the plaintiff, i.e., when the original defendant
was held to be not liable, the court stated:
If we had the original statute alone to construe, under the
case of Vinnacombe v. City of Philadelphia, we would
sustain, unhesitatingly, the appellant's contention that a
judgment cannot be directly entered in favor of the plaintiff
. . . The Legislature, in 1931, however, saw fit to enlarge the
powers of the court, so that an additional defendant alone
may be held to be primarily liable to plaintiff [and judgment
62
entered in favor of plaintiff]."
Other cases decided before Sheriff v. Eisele also interpreted the
joinder rules, specifically Pa. R. Civ. P, 2255(d) which governs
plaintiffs' rights against additional defendants, consistent with the
pre-Rule statutes. 63 In Rau v. Manko the supreme court stated that
60. McCaulif, 168 A. at 539 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
61. 176 A. 751 (Pa Super. Ct. 1935).
62. Huber Invest. Co., 176 A. at 752 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The Huber
court upheld the judgment entered against the additional defendant and in favor of plaintiff,
recognizing only that the June 1931 amendment enlarged its powers to enter judgments. Id.
Similarly, in Sullivan v. City of Pittsburgh, the additional defendants argued that because
the original defendants alleged only liability over, and the original defendants' allegations
were insufficient to support a verdict against the additional defendants, they could not be
held to be solely liable to plaintiff. The court held that the Pub. L. No. 236 amendment
"permitted verdict and judgment in favor of plaintiff against the additional defendants, as if
the latter had been directly sued by plaintiff." 27 A.2d 270, 271 (emphasis added).
63. Pa. R. Civ. P. 2255 was adopted in 1939, revised slightly in 1942, and has remained
unchanged since.
64. 17 A.2d 422 (Pa. 1941). At the time the Rau case was decided, the Rules of Civil
Procedure required a plaintiff to elect whether to file a supplemental statement against the
additional defendant. Rau, 17 A2d at 424. If the plaintiff was not interested in the claim
between the original defendant and the additional defendant, she could elect not to fie a
supplemental statement. She then, however, was precluded from taking recovery against the
additional defendant. Id. However, plaintiff's decision not to file a supplemental statement
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Pa. R. Civ. P. 22526 is "substantially the same as the corresponding
provision in the amendment of June 22, 1931 ... [and] the Act of
April 10, 1929... both of which are suspended by the Rules."6 The
court also recognized that Pa. R. Civ. P. 2252 "does not and was not
intended to enable a plaintiff, who has no control over the
litigation between the defendant and the additional defendant, to
67
prevent adjudication of their rights."
Similarly, in Zachrel v. Universal Oil Prod. Co. 8 and Simodejka
v. Williams,69 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that
procedure between original defendants and joined parties "shall be
the same as though the party joining the additional defendant were
a plaintiff and the additional defendant were a defendant."70
Nothing in the decisions vested a plaintiff with rights at the time of
joinder; rather, a plaintiffs rights vested only after a finding at trial
that the additional defendant was liable to plaintiff. This
interpretation is consistent with pre-Rule cases and the plain
language of present-day Pa. R. Civ. P. 2255.
Finally, the Pennsylvania Bar Association, in discussing the "new"
joinder rules in 1942, noted that the rules give "the plaintiff the
right to recover directly from an additional defendant ... who is
found solely liable to him or jointly with the defendant, exactly as
if he had been an original defendant."71 The discussions evidenced
the understanding that plaintiffs' right of recovery develops at the
did not affect the issues for resolution between the original defendant and the joined party.
Id.
65. Pa. R. Civ. P. 2252, which governs the grounds on which a person may be joined as
an additional defendant, was adopted in 1939 and amended several times, with the most
recent amendment in 1990. However, the grounds on which a person may be joined as an
additional defendant have remained substantially unchanged since the passage of the rules.
Indeed, a comparison of the language of Pa. R. Civ. P. 2252(a) and the Pub. L No. 236
amendment demonstrates the strong similarity: Present day Pa. R. Civ. P. 2252 allows joinder
of any person "who may be (1) solely liable on the plaintiffs cause of action, or (2) liable
over to the joining party ... , or (3) jointly or severally liable with the joining party...; or
(4) liable to the joining party..." PA. R. Civ. P. 2252. Pub. L No. 236 allowed joinder by a
defendant of any "person alleged to be [1] alone liable or [2] liable over to him . . . or [3]
jointly or severally liable therefor with him..."
66. Rau, 17 A-2d at 424. See also Land Title Bank & Trust v. Cheltenham Nat'l Bank, 66
A.2d 768, 773 (Pa. 1949) ("Because of the similarity in the wording of the new rule and that
of the Act of 1929 . . . [tihe rules of Civil Procedure . . . do not change the law as we
declared it in the cases [previously] cited.").
67. Rau, 17 A.2d at 424.
68. 49 A.2d 704 (Pa. 1946).
69. 62 A.2d 17 (Pa. 1948).
70. Zachrel, 49 A.2d at 706; Simodejka, 62 A.2d at 17-18.
71. Pennsylvania Bar Ass'n, Report of the Forty-Eighth Annual Meeting, June 30 - July
2, 1942 at 146-47 (italics in original).
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time of a finding of liability and not at the time of joinder.72 As then
understood, plaintiffs did not have any control over the litigation
between the original and additional defendants before a finding of
73
liability.
V.

ANALYSIS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE JOINDER RULES AND ITS

EFFECT ON CURRENT INTERPRETATION

The legislative history of Pennsylvania's joinder rules, including
the case law interpreting them (until the 1955 decision in Sheriff v.
Eisele), supports the plain language of Pa. R. Civ. P. 2255(d) that a
plaintiff may "recover from an additional defendant found liable
....
as though such additional defendant had been joined as a
defendant. . ."74 The statute, when viewed in light of the history of
joinder in Pennsylvania and by its own terms, does not provide a
plaintiff with any rights in the third-party claim unless and until
the additional defendant is shown to be liable.7 5 The pre-Sheriff
decisions recognized that Pa R. Civ. P. 2255(d) does not contain
any language that would strip away the rights of original
defendants on their claim against the additional defendant. And, Pa.
R. Civ. P. 2255(d) does not, by its terms, prohibit an original
defendant from discontinuing its claim against a third-party
defendant prior to a finding of liability. By its terms, Pa. R. Civ. P.
2255(d) merely permits the trial judge to mold a verdict after a
finding of liability to save the plaintiff the cost and expense of
filing another complaint against the third-party defendant.
VI.

A

PROPOSED SOLUTION TO PROTECT THE INTERESTS OF DEFENDANTS

IN THIRD-PARTY PRACTICE

The recent case law interpreting Pennsylvania's joinder rules
often places defendants in the untenable position of either having
to (1) join a third party quickly at the outset of litigation, before
having a meaningful opportunity to gather information regarding
the effect that the joinder may have later in the case, 76 or (2) wait
72. See id.
73. Id.
74. PA. R. Civ. P. 2252(d) (emphasis added).
75. See 7 GOODRICH-AMRAM 2D, STANDARD PENNSYLVANIA PRACTICE, § 2252:1 (1992).
76. The realities of modem-day litigation make it extremely difficult, if not impossible,
to conduct effective discovery within 60 days of a defendant's receipt of a complaint to
determine the extent of plaintiffs injuries or other alleged harm, the identity of potential
additional defendants, their financial wherewithal and available resources to satisfy a
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until sufficient information is developed before attempting to join
the third party. If a defendant chooses the former, it risks
substantially increasing the amount that it eventually may be forced
to pay to resolve the case.7 7 If a defendant chooses the latter, it
risks the court disallowing joinder on the basis of untimeliness or
being precluded from alleging that the joined party is solely liable
to the plaintiff. Moreover, in this latter circumstance, even if leave
to join is granted by the court, the defendant will be restricted to
recovering only contribution and/or indemnity from the joined party
because of the expiration of the statute of limitations period on
plaintiff's claim. Because of the Hobson's choice that defendants
currently face, which can have a dramatic adverse impact on the
amount of damages that a defendant ultimately may be required to
pay, we propose several amendments to Pennsylvania's joinder
rules.
A.

ProposedAmendments to Pennsylvania'sJoinder Rules

Several amendments (signified by italics) to the current joinder
rules would level the playing field of Pennsylvania third-party
practice.
1.

Extension of Time for Joinder as a Matter of Right

The time limit for joining parties as a matter of right should be
extended from sixty to one hundred twenty days following service
of the complaint, to allow a defendant to investigate fully and
consider the impact of the joinder decision. Such investigation
would allow defendants a fair and reasonable opportunity to
judgment, and other strategic issues that may bear upon the decision to join a third party.
For example, defense counsel may only receive the complaint from their client after many of
the 60 days have elapsed. A change in defense counsel at the outset of a case will also
consume much of the allotted time.
Even if defense counsel promptly commences discovery, extensions of time to respond to
interrogatories and document requests are routinely requested and granted as professional
courtesies. Moreover, plaintiffs often need substantial time to gather the requested
documents that may influence and impact the issue of whether to join a third party.
Gathering relevant documents from nonparties also takes significant time. Third-party
subpoenas and depositions, even under the best of circumstances, often take months to
schedule and complete.
In light of these factors, the 60-day time limit for joinder as of right is simply too short.
The time period should be substantially increased.
77. Regardless of whether a settlement is reached or a verdict ultimately entered, a
solvent or deep-pocket defendant will be required to make up the insolvent additional
defendant's share of liability.

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 36:521

explore through discovery both the potential amount of damages at
issue and the third party's ability to satisfy a potential judgment.
Pa. R. Civ. P. 2253 would thus be amended as follows:
Rule 2253. Time for Filing Praecipe or Complaint
Except as provided by Rule 1041.1(e), neither praecipe for a
writ to join an additional defendant nor a complaint if the
joinder is commenced by a complaint, shall be filed by the
original defendant or an additional defendant later than one
hundred twenty days (120) after the service upon the original
defendant of the initial pleading of the plaintiff or any
amendment thereof unless such filing is allowed by the court
upon cause shown.
2.

Allow a Specified Time Periodfor Dismissal of a
Joined Party as a Matter of Right

Defendants should also be permitted to dismiss their third-party
claims within a specified period of time should it become clear that
the joinder will work to their detriment at trial, i.e., by requiring a
defendant to pay not only its judicially determined share of
damages, but also the share of an insolvent joined party. A 120-day
period for this discontinuance is proposed. Combined with the
previous amendment, defendants could use the 120-day period at
the commencement of an action either to investigate whether
joinder of right is advantageous or, if joinder is completed before
the expiration of the 120 days, to determine whether the earlier
joinder will prejudice their case.
Rule 2255. Procedure
(a) The procedure, including pleadings, between the party
joining an additional defendant and the additional defendant
shall be the same as though the party joining the additional
defendant were a plaintiff and the additional defendant were a
defendant.
(1) The third-party plaintiff shall have the right, within
one hundred twenty (120) days after service upon the
third-party plaintiff of the initial pleading of the plaintiff
or any amendment thereof, to discontinue any action
brought by the third-party plaintiff against any additional
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defendant.

(2) Within thirty (30) days following discontinuance of a
third-party claim by a third-party plaintiff, the original
plaintiff shall be permitted to file an amended complaint
naming the additional defendant as a party upon cause
shown. Cause shown shall require the original plaintiff to
demonstrate that she (i) exercised due diligence before
filing suit to determine all persons who may be liable to
her on the cause of action, and (ii) despite her exercise of
due diligence, she was unable to ascertain the identity of
the additional defendant sought to be added.
B. A Defense of the Proposed Amendments
The proposed rules seek to balance the interests of plaintiffs in
proceeding to trial quickly without devoting excessive time to
procedural issues, with the interests of defendants in being able to
investigate the effects that joinder of a third party might have on
the case. The proposed rules avoid the inequitable shifting of
burdens that currently occurs when defendants are forced to make
joinder decisions quickly, without being able to discover or obtain
information about the potential liability of the third party and the
ability of the third party to pay any portion of a verdict assessed
against her.
The first proposed amendment, which simply enlarges the time
within which a defendant may join an additional defendant as of
right, permits defendants approximately the same opportunity to
investigate the facts and circumstances that plaintiffs have before
initiating suit. At the same time, the new 120-day time limit on
joinder as a matter of right should ensure that additional parties
will not enter the litigation at a late stage and, therefore, delay a
trial on the merits.79
78. Alternatively, the 120-day period for joinder or dismissal of joined claims could be
calculated back from the close of discovery or the trial date. In many Pennsylvania counties,
however, discovery deadlines and/or trial dates are not set sufficiently in advance to allow
such a joinder and/or dismissal decision to be planned. In these counties, a "backward"
running of the time computation would prove impracticable.
79. Goodrich-Amram notes that "[w]ithout some limitation on the time within which
this right [joinder as a matter of course] must be exercised, it would be possible for the
defendants to delay the plaintiff indefinitely by collusively joining a series of additional
defendants." 7 GOODRICH-AMRAM 2D, STANDARD PENNSYLVANIA PRACTICE, § 2253:1 (1992). Simply
enlarging the time period for joinder as of right from 60 to 120 days will not run afoul of this

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 36:521

The second amendment provides similar results for both parties.
The amendment allows defendants an opportunity following prompt
joinder to continue to investigate the additional defendant's
potential liability and impact on the litigation. If, upon conducting
discovery, an original defendant learns that the joined party's
presence will prejudice its case, the original defendant has an
opportunity to discontinue its third-party action.
At the same time, the 120-day time limit on discontinuance by an
original defendant of the action against the joined party assures
plaintiffs that procedural issues will not delay trial on the merits.
This proposed amendment also provides plaintiffs with the
additional safeguard of reinitiating claims against the joined party if
the plaintiff can show that she exercised due diligence before filing
suit to identify all persons potentially liable to her, but that she still
had no knowledge of the joined party's identity at the time she filed
her complaint.8°
VII.

CONCLUSION

The issue of whether a defendant remains master of the claims
against a joined party is critically important, especially in light of
the trend of increasing jury verdicts and Pennsylvania's unwavering
allegiance to the concept of joint and several liability.8, A defendant
who, without sufficient opportunity to investigate the facts, joins an
additional party may find itself in the unhappy situation of paying a
legitimate concern. An additional 60 days will not delay trial in most, if not all,
circumstances. See supra discussion in notes 11, 76.
80. This proposed amendment may result, in some circumstances, in an extension of
the statute of limitations applicable to plaintiff's claims. The joinder rules, however, already
provide for such an extension by permitting a defendant to allege that an additional
defendant is "solely liable" to plaintiff, notwithstanding the statute of limitations, provided
that the additional defendant is joined with 60 days following service of the complaint. PA. R.
CIv. P. 2252(a)(i), 2253; see supra notes 3, 17. The courts have also interpreted the joinder
rules in some circumstances to allow an extension of the applicable statute of limitations.
See Dash v. Wilap Corp., 495 A.2d 950, 956 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985); see also supra note 39.
In theory, it remains possible for a plaintiff, who misses the statute of limitations against
an additional defendant, to collude with a defendant to bring a third-party claim. If these
circumstances are discovered by the additional defendant, the trial court should strike the
joinder or, at the very least, allow the additional defendant to present evidence of the
collusive activity to the jury. See, e.g., Hatfield v. Continental Imports, 610 A.2d 446 (Pa.
1992) (remedy for collusive "Mary Carter" settlement agreement is to allow the admissibility
of the agreement at trial to show party's biased financial interests).
81. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7102(b) (1997); Walton v. Avco Corp., 610 A.2d 454,
462-63 (Pa. 1992) (discussing liability of joint tortfeasors found strictly liable to plaintiffs);
Charles v. Giant Eagle Markets, 522 A.2d 1, 4 (Pa. 1987).
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large verdict, even though it has only minimal liability. Amendments
are needed to level the playing field of third-party litigation and
bring it in line with the original intent of the joinder rules.

